As long as we’re going back to the time when aristocrats raced for “the sheer pleasure of seeing their runners perform,” let’s go back further to the time when breeding and racing were wrapped inseparably in a folk tradition sustained by yoeman farmers. I’d argue that the aristocratic period, from the late18th- through the 19th century, was a stage in the industrial organization of breeding and racing and that its main thrust was to appropriate that all but forgotten folk tradition to the business-industrial model. We call it an “aristocratic tradition,” but it couldn’t reproduce itself. It could only evolve with the broader economic environment. That process drove asunder the businesses of breeding and racing, resulting in, as you aptly put it, “the deeply insidious, fractured nature of the U.S. racing and breeding industries.” But that was Veblen’s point exactly.

I’d add that in the background of this post were my thoughts about a post Sid Fernando wrote at his website on the Suburban H., which was run at 9 furlongs this year instead of 10 furlongs. No doubt, immediate pressures conspired to make this happen, and no doubt there is blame enough to be divided between both sides of the industrial-business model for its long-term effects.

When (most) people refer to what you call the “system of racing” as “the product”, they are doing so because Thoroughbred racehorses would not exist – at least not in their currently recognizable form – were it not for that system. And within the context of that system, purse structures, how racing is presented, what forms of gambling are allowed, etc., are the key variables contributing to the overall success (or failure) of the industry. Long gone are the days when the aristocracy would race for the sheer pleasure of seeing their runners perform.

It is also a fact that people are most attracted to the highest quality in any sport. That can easily be deduced by looking the depth and quality of the players on teams that perform in well-run leagues (i.e. those which restrict the number of teams), or the amounts of money gambled on various events.

Thoroughbred racing in the U.S., for reasons that I don’t need to review here, has chosen over the decades during which other sports developed far more successful and powerful leagues, to retain a model which is diluted to a degree that is otherwise unheard of. It would be as if the NBA decided to have 300 teams, with one good player on each team.

This has been a predictable recipe for disaster, and while there are other relevant variables to consider, it is no surprise that racing in Hong Kong, for example, attracts per-race levels of betting that dwarf that of racing in the U.S.

There is no doubt that a contraction of racing will impact the breeding industry, but, if handled properly (a BIG if, admittedly), it will also help to rejuvenate the industry. A higher concentration of quality horses competing for bigger purses in larger fields would go a long way to halting, and reversing the rapid decline of the sport.

As to the potential “sabotage” of the breeding industry, I can’t help but to react cynically. The U.S. breeding industry has, in large part, been responsible for its current (and any near-future) woes. For the past 25 years (or so) the selfish, short-sighted trend followed by most breeders has been to breed to sell, rather than breeding to race. So is it any surprise that the sport is now inundated with intrinsically unsound, often hot-tempered animals that rarely stay a step beyond nine furlongs?

Sadly, as further illustration of the deeply insidious, fractured nature of the U.S. racing and breeding industries, little thought is given to how the emphasis on breeding particular types of animals might impact the broader business in the longer term, nor is serious thought given to how eliminating “distance” races and catering to cheap horses might be degrading the game.

Unfortunately, I could go on, and on, and on…